Development of the Greenland Home Rule Model and its Relevance to an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region by Lyck, Lise
 
1 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREENLAND HOME RULE MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AN 
AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION 
 
(Paper presented at the International Research Seminar on “Governance in Autonomy Statuses:  Institutions 
and Mechanisms”, held in Geneva on 22 March 2012) 
 
by Lise Lyck 
Lecturer, Center for Tourism and Culture Management, Copenhagen 
 
Introduction to the Article 
The purpose of this article is to present and analyze the Greenland Home Rule from a government and 
governance perspective and to relate it to the Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the 
Sahara region and thereby to contribute to an end of this dispute. 
In order to make a presentation and analysis meaningful, a presentation of the historical and political context 
for the Nordic development is required and also a short comparison to the context for the Sahara region 
question, keeping in mind the differences between the two political, social, historical, and cultural contexts. In 
particular, while the autonomy of Greenland is well established since many years, the proposal for Sahara is 
still open for negotiation by all the parties and has been considered by the UN Security Council as “serious 
and credible”, which should be understood as an encouragement to all parties to use it as a starting point for 
negotiations, and enrich the scope of power devolution.  
Needed is also a short overview over autonomy models and the development of autonomy statutes to give a 
perspective on the options. 
On this background the Greenland Home Rule Model is presented and analyzed and the 
government/governance problematic analyzed in depth. 
The relevance for the Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Saharan region of the 
juridical formulation and the experiences from Greenland is discussed and the learning presented pointing 
out advantages and pitfalls to consider and evaluate. 
The last section includes a conclusion based on the presented analysis and some recommendation to 
consider. All is presented for further discussion and evaluation among the stakeholders interested in a 
solution of the autonomy question for the Sahara region.    
 
Historical and Political Context 
Denmark has been a kingdom for more than 1000 years and was back in time a superpower in the North. It 
included the Western part of the present UK, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Baltic Sea coast territories and 
the islands in the Baltic Sea (among those the Aaland Islands, see below) and the islands North of Scotland, 
the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Svalbard and Greenland. The North Atlantic Sea was called Mare Nostrum (Latin 
meaning “our Sea”). However, after the Viking Age the parts of UK (not the islands) ceased to be part of 
Denmark and so did the Northern Baltic Sea parts of the present Germany. 
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In 1397 a treaty was signed in Kalmar (the Kalmar Union), deciding that Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
should be one kingdom. Queen Margrethe the First became the first formal ruler of this big country. The 
economic interests between Sweden and Denmark developed in opposite directions and the Kalmar Union 
ceased to exist in 1526. Sweden became a kingdom and only the South of Sweden, including the provinces 
Scania, Halland and Blekinge, continued to be a part of the Danish kingdom, but continuous conflicts 
resulted in wars between Denmark and Sweden during many years, especially in the 1600s where Sweden 
expanded the country through wars in Finland, the Eastern Baltic Sea territories and the present Poland and 
the former East Germany. In 1648 the Swedes won the war with Denmark and the Southern Swedish 
provinces Scania, Blekinge and Halland were included in Sweden. Denmark tried to regain the provinces 
until the end of the Great Nordic war in 1721. 
Norway and Denmark continued as one kingdom till 1814 as decided by the Kalmar Union, i. e. as one 
kingdom for 417 years (the end was due to the Napoleon wars, where Denmark was allied with Napoleon 
and Sweden against Napoleon. After the war Sweden got a French general as king.). At that occasion 
Norway came under Swedish sovereignty till 1905, when Norway became a sovereign state and appointed a 
Danish prince as king.    
The South of Denmark included the present German “Bundesland” Schleswig-Holstein. Through history 
when the king had more sons, Schleswig-Holstein had been “ruled” by son number two and a specific treaty 
on Schleswig-Holstein being a part of the Danish Realm but with own taxes, laws etc. was created. It is the 
origin to the later autonomy statutes for Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland.  
Schleswig-Holstein as well as the part of Denmark up to the river Kongeåen (from Kolding to Esbjerg) 
became part of Germany after the wars with the Germans in the 1860s. After World War I a referendum was 
held to decide the new border between Denmark and Germany and the result of this is the present border. 
At the Kiel peace in 1814 the Svalbard islands were simply forgotten. Due to this Svalbard first in 1920 got 
an autonomy status by an international treaty as many countries had got economic interests in Svalbard, but 
under Norwegian sovereignty. 
The Aaland Islands in the Botnic Bay between Sweden (40 km) and Finland (100 km) also have autonomy 
given by an international treaty in 1921 (The League of Nations). The population is Swedish-speaking and 
wanted to become a part of Sweden, but they got autonomy and came under Finnish sovereignty and were 
demilitarized. The reason was that iron from the North of Sweden was transported to Germany and used for 
canons and weapons during World War I.  
As seen, wars, heritage rules and also to some degree gifts in connections to royal weddings explain the 
territorial and constitutional background for government and governance. 
 
Overview 1. The Nordic Countries and Government and Governance Frame 
Sovereign States Sovereignty Since Size of population Territory State Form 
Denmark 910 (estimate) 5.5 million 43,000 km
2
 Kingdom 
Sweden 1526 8.5 million 449,904 km
2
 Kingdom 
Norway 1905 4.9 million 385,252 km
2
 Kingdom 
Finland 
1918 (autonomy 
Sweden 1809, part 
of Soviet Union 
5.4 million 338,424 km
2
 Republic 
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1917) 
Iceland 1944 311,000 103,000 km
2
 Republic 
 
Autonomies 
Svalbard 1920 1,850 62,050 km
2
 
Norwegian 
sovereignty 
Aaland Islands 1921 27,000 
1,527 km
2 (
6527 
islands, 60 
inhabited) 
Finnish sovereignty 
 
Homerule 
Faroe Islands 1948 49,257 1,399 km
2
 Danish Realm 
Greenland 
1979 (1721-1953: 
Danish colony) 
56,000 
2,175,600 km
2
 
(incl. (1,833,900 
km
2
 of ice cap) 
Danish Realm 
 
Overview 1 shows:  
 A long well-documented history   
 Immense territories 
 Relatively small populations 
 Time differences in achieving sovereignty 
 Wars have had a decisive impact over time 
 A development towards still more self-determination 
Overview 2: Sahara and Neighbouring Countries 
Sovereign States Sovereignty Since Size of Population Territory State Form 
Morocco 1956 32,728,000 446,550 km
2
 Kingdom 
Algeria 1962 37,100,000 2,400,000 km
2
 Republic 
Libya 1947 5,700,000 1,759,541 km
2
 Republic 
 
Sahara Region  200,000 266,060 km
2
  
 
Compared to the North, in the Sahara the following regional context is found: 
 Also immense territories 
 Bigger populations than found in the Nordic area 
 Later achievements of sovereignty 
 Wars and conflicts and military takeovers part of the near past and present time 
 Unsolved constitutional questions 
 A colonial history  
 A tribal society 
To add further: 
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 Measured by gross domestic product, the counties in the North are rich  
 Natural resources as well as minerals play a decisive role both in the North and in the North of Africa 
 In the North, the populations are more homogeneous than in Africa 
 The educational level is higher in the North than in Africa 
 The religion in the North is mainly Christianity, in Africa it is more heterogeneous  
 The democracies in the North are well established through many years 
The presented context must be taken under consideration when Greenland and the Sahara region are 
discussed in relation to autonomy and Home Rule and other government and governance models.    
Kacowicz (1995) identified three zones of positive security zones: 
 A subsystem of states within states are satisfied with the status quo, but where conflicts still can 
arise and lead to a negative peace, 
 A community or society of nation-states satisfied with the status quo in which any domestic and 
international conflict remain non-violent, making a stable peace 
 A pluralistic security community of nation-states with stable expectations of peaceful change, in 
which the member states are all democratic; they share common political institutions and are deeply 
interdependent. 
The zones can be further characterized as seen (Clive Archer and Pertti Joenniemi, eds. 2003 p.4) leading 
to a discussion of the North (the Nordic states) as a “peaceful region”. Clive Archer (1996) stresses that it is 
not only the avoidance of war but to a high degree the culture of compromise and solidarity built over time 
that constitutes a peaceful region.  In its resolutions since 2008, the UN Security Council has been stressing 
“that realism and a spirit of compromise by all the parties are essential” for the success of the process of 
negotiations on the Sahara region.  
Those ideas are important to consider if the Sahara region and the countries around shall develop into a 
peaceful region. It requires strategy and stakeholder perspectives with gradual approaches and here are 
some lessons to be learnt from the Greenland Home Rule process presented in a later section of this article. 
 
Autonomy and Home Rule Models 
Autonomy models grant certain rights and powers to 1) the population living in a specific territory; 2) peoples; 
3) people living in a specific area. As a consequence, autonomy can be based on a relation to population 
within a territory, to ethnicity or to a combination of territory and ethnicity. 
The normal requirements for autonomy models for achieving constitutional legitimacy will be, that they are 1) 
given by an international treaty or 2) are part of a constitution. The mentioned autonomy models for Svalbard 
and for the Aaland Islands are of the first mentioned category. The other category has been applied by 
Portugal and the Netherlands for instance.  
The Danish Home Rule model for the Faroe Islands and Greenland are sometimes called quasi autonomy 
models of the second category because they are neither given by an international treaty or part of the Danish 
Constitution. The autonomy model for the Faroe Islands is from 1948 and the latest Danish Constitution from 
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1953. It tells that it had been possible to include the Home Rule autonomy for the Faroe Islands into the 
Danish Constitution.  
Many guesses and hypotheses have been presented to explain why the Home Rule model wasn’t included 
in the Danish Constitution. Among the explanations is the upcoming of the Cold War that created a fear that 
communism could be rooted in the North Atlantic islands. Another explanation presented was that autonomy 
in the Danish state – Denmark being an extremely decentralized state – could be better considered as a part 
of decentralization. Thirdly, speculation has been that the autonomy model could be more flexible and more 
dynamic and future oriented in relation to transfer of powers if changes shouldn’t be mentioned in a 
constitution, as it is difficult to change the constitution. In comparison with Canadian Models it has also been 
stressed that the flexibility in the Danish Home Rule model made current adjustments in relation to changes 
in the society possible, while the Canadian Models demand a clear reference to past rights and history and 
in this sense become backward oriented. 
The weakness in the Danish model is that it can be questioned if the transfer of rights is irreversible or if it 
can be taken back by the state, i.e. if autonomy models are a kind of government or governance. In other 
words, can the autonomy be called back as a change of decentralization by a government decision? It is 
maybe a theoretical discussion but it is a question of constitutional law versus peoples’ rights in international 
law. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Home Rule should be made reversible by a plurality in the 
Danish Parliament. 
The Danish Home Rule model being a quasi autonomy model is not the only exemption from the traditional 
Home Rule definition. Think for instance on the Dayton Agreement that ended the 3½ year long war between 
Serbia and Bosnia-and-Herzegovina with 279,000 dead in 1995. It is a very special kind of agreement based 
on ethnic divisions, but with a unique government-governance structure. Probably it must be considered as a 
kind of autonomy model? In general, there seems to be new models for dealing with conflicts implying that 
the legal structure with the UN and the almost 200 sovereign states and 3,500 peoples of the world is not the 
only legal way of conflict solving.  
The sovereign state concept has become heterogeneous due to the change of size of states. After World 
War I, there were 51 sovereign states in the world. After World War II, there were still only the 5 microstates 
(The Vatican State, Monaco, San Marino, Andorra and Iceland), but now about a fourth of the states are 
microstates, involving a mixed picture of powers and government/governance structures. During the time 
from World I until now also many autonomy systems have evolved, creating a diversity of options for 
government/governance structures. 
Furthermore, also the juridical system for dealing with government/governance structures has today not only 
the options given by the institutionalized international set up. New competing models giving priority to human 
rights overruling the UN procedure are in progress. It was seen in the Iraq war, in Americans getting Osama 
Bin Laden in Pakistan, in the Guantánamo base case, in the intervention in Libya, etc. All signal that a veto 
in the Security Council does stop actions that, strictly considered, demand that all members agree. Taking 
those signals seriously imply, in relation to Sahara, that a solution for Sahara cannot be delayed and 
postponed any longer and that a solution must include a strong human right component together with 
transfer of powers in an autonomy model. The Moroccan Initiative, which does include a dimension of human 
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rights, responded to the call of the UN Security Council, since 2004, to all parties to cooperate fully with each 
other and the UN in order to bring this long-lasting dispute to an end. The current security challenges in the 
region, including terrorism, are also a key factor in favour of a prompt settlement of this dispute. 
Self-determination refers both to states and peoples (especially indigenous peoples). It is originally a 
sociological concept applied in a legal context to subjects that mostly are not well defined. It creates 
problems for concise analyses (Harhoff, F. 1988). Having said this, self-determination is about protecting 
individual and group interests against a more powerful institution (state, society) by giving individuals/groups 
legal rights. The rights transferred can be domestic in relation to culture, religion, economy, law and order, 
politics etc. and external in relation to other countries, including also security and military issues. Roos, A. 
(1954) pointed out that it would be logical if the transferred rights were prevailing both domestically and 
externally. However, the system is not logical in that sense as, although rights are transferred, it is normal 
that the sovereign state keeps the rights for transferred areas in relation to external matters. Worth to 
mention is that the ongoing globalization seems to change this, adding external dimensions to the 
transferred rights.  
How foreign affairs are dealt with in autonomy models often has a strong interest, as it is often a crucial issue 
in implementing autonomy. An overview of many of the existing solutions to this problematic is found in 
Hannum, H. 1988. 
How economic rights are dealt with also varies, but as far as I know, there exists no coherent overview of the 
options. The most important issues are normally found to be on taxation and on natural and mineral rights.  
The existing autonomy models present different solutions to the mentioned problematic.   
 
The Greenland Home Rule Development 
Greenland was originally inhabited by Inuits and from about 950 by Vikings mainly coming from Iceland. 
Iceland was earlier (about 850) inhabited by Vikings coming from Norway and Denmark. Around 1400, the 
Vikings disappeared from Greenland. Some continued to America (Newfoundland) and other died or left 
Greenland due to what is called the “little ice age” when the temperature decreased much.  
In the 1600s and 1700s, expeditions from the Danish king were sent out to find out about the situation in 
Greenland. They found Inuits, but no descendants from the Vikings. It was the background for Greenland 
becoming a Danish colony in 1721. Greenland was a remote place. From an economic point of view, there 
was an interest for whaling and some kinds of fur, but Greenland was not an economy coherent with the rest 
of the world. It was first after World War II that modernization in Greenland started. 
In Denmark the idea of Denmark being a colonial power was found outdated and the constitutional trend at 
that time was assimilation. Newfoundland became a province of Canada, Alaska became a state in US and 
former colonies started to become sovereign states. By the new Danish Constitution of 1953, Greenland 
became a Danish county, and the colony status defined by the UN Treaty chapter 11 ceased to exist.  
In the 1960s the assimilation phase was followed by an increased interest in the rights of indigenous peoples 
both in the UN and in ILO as well as local interests for land claims in Canada and in Alaska (Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) from 1971.  
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In Denmark, a commission with Danish and Greenlandic members was established in the 1973 to find a 
model for self-determination in Greenland. It resulted in the Home Rule Act for Greenland 1979. The most 
difficult question to agree on was the subsurface rights. The then Danish Prime minister (a Social-Democrat) 
announced that if Greenland should have these rights, Greenland must leave the Danish Realm. Among the 
Inuits a new political party was created – the IA (Inuit Ataqatigiit) – with the main goal that subsurface and 
mineral rights should be transferred to Greenland jurisdiction. In the Home Rule Act it reads: “Greenland has 
the fundamental mineral and subsurface rights”. It is not a juridical concept and it was a way to continue the 
work with the Home Rule Act and then putting this question aside to later. The Home Rule Act was passed 
by the Danish Parliament and was accepted in Greenland by a big majority. 
Since then, a successful implementation has taken place. It was planned to take place from 1979-1989, but it 
went faster. Since the transfer, also other things have happened that have had an influence on the need for 
a revision of the law. Worth to mention is especially that the Home Rule in the Faroe Islands in 1992 
achieved the subsurface rights by an agreement with the Danish state. The new Home Rule Act 2009 is not 
within a delegation frame that can be revoked as it opens for sovereignty, but the timing has to be decided 
by the Greenland Home Rule politicians.  
For many years, Greenland has received an annual subsidy from Denmark on 3-3.5 million DKK 
(corresponding to about 500,000 euros) and it is not considered likely to change fundamentally in the coming 
years. Therefore, it will be very costly for Greenland if the politicians in Greenland decided that Greenland 
should become a sovereign state.  
 
The Content of Greenland Government and Governance 
Firstly, the Home Rule model refers to a population in a territory. Sanders, D. (1985) wrote: “In my view no 
meaningful autonomy is possible without a distinct territorial base for the population.” It is totally in line with 
the basic thinking in the Danish Home Rule models. It means that it is not an ethnic model (not peoples, but 
population within a territory). 
Secondly, it is from a theoretical point of view a delegation model, but in practice and in the 2009 Home 
Rule, the Act for Greenland is an irreversible model. 
Thirdly, it includes a comprehensive range of policy decision-making instruments and areas transferred, 
including all economic powers except from the exchange rate policy and monetary policy. 
Fourthly, it is possible not to join Denmark in international agreements, but participation in international 
agreements of which Denmark is not a member is restricted; it can in some cases be negotiated positively 
with the Danish state. Worth to mention is that Greenland held a referendum in 1982, as promised by the 
Danish state under the Home Rule negotiations in the 1970s.The referendum ended with a no (53% against) 
and Greenland left the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985, and was granted an Overseas 
Countries and Territory (OCT) status (Denmark became an EU member in 1973).  
Fifthly, mineral and subsurface rights were not included in the 1979 Home Rule Act for Greenland. The new 
2009 Home Rule gives Greenland rights, but not full rights. 
Sixthly, the Greenland Home Rule government is entitled to a Danish block grant as mentioned earlier until a 
surplus from using the mineral and subsurface rights exceeds the size of the state block grant considerably. 
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Seventhly, the Supreme Court is in Copenhagen and is the Supreme Court for the whole Danish Realm. 
Eighthly, the population living in Greenland elects two members to the Danish Parliament (which has in total 
179 members, including two from the Faroe Islands and the two from Greenland). 
Ninthly, The Greenland Home Rule model is a pragmatic and dynamic model with current fixed negotiations 
among the Danish Prime Minister, and “the Prime Ministers” of the Greenland and the Faroese Home Rule.  
The transferred areas in 1979 included: 
1. Organization of Home Rule in Greenland 
2. Organization of local government 
3. Direct and indirect taxes 
4. The Church and dissenting religious communities 
5. Fishery in the territory, hunting, agriculture and reindeer breeding 
6. Preservation 
7. Country planning 
8. Legislation on trade and competition, including legislation on restaurant and hotel business, 
regulation on alcoholic beverages, regulation on closing times for shops 
9. Social welfare 
10. Harbour market affairs 
11. Education and cultural affairs, including vocational training 
12. Other matters related to trade and support of economic activities 
13. Health services 
14. Rent regulations and housing administration 
15. Supply of goods 
16. Domestic transportation of people and goods 
17. Protection of the environment 
In 2004 a commission to revise the Home Rule Act was decided. The mandate given was: the point of 
departure should be the 1979 Home Rule Act and should be based on a principle of balance between rights 
and duties. A new proposal for the economic relations between Denmark and Greenland should be included. 
Also a proposal on how Greenland could achieve sovereignty based on unanimity between the Danish 
government and the Greenland Home Rule government, meaning that it is the Greenland population that 
decides if Greenland wants to achieve sovereignty (paragraph 21). The new Act came into force in 2009.  
Thirty-two new areas could be taken over. The main changes were the following: 
1. The Inuits were recognized as a people 
2. The Inuit language became an official language together with Danish 
3. The Greenland people has property rights on the resources in land and in sea within the Greenland 
territory 
4. The Danish block grant will continue so long as the Greenland economy is not self-sustaining 
5. An increase of the educational level 
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6. More influence on foreign policy 
7. A new principle for transfer of responsibilities without financing from Denmark  
The Greenland Home Rule Act from 1979 was more comprehensive than the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, which consists of 46 articles in 9 main sections. 
The Greenland Home Rule Act from 2009 is even more comprehensive in relation to transfer of powers and 
opens a route to becoming a sovereign state. 
 
Experiences from Greenland to Consider in Relation to the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an 
Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region  
In Greenland, there are four political parties and the political development has been stable. Greenlandic 
politicians have managed to make Greenland well known internationally. There have been examples of 
corruption, but at a very low scale. The economic development has not given Greenland an economic growth 
that could make its economy independent of the Danish block grant and subsidies. Fisheries are a main 
income source. Mining has not contributed much to the economy. Also tourism contributes relatively little to 
the economic development. The educational level has been increased. Greenland has achieved more self-
determination and on more areas. 
 
The Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region includes 35 items placed 
in three sections.  
 
The first is on Morocco’s commitment to a final political solution. It is an open and positive commitment to 
achieve an autonomy statute for a territory in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and under 
Moroccan sovereignty with the Sahara populations running their affairs democratically and with a referendum 
that decides the proposal. It also guarantees all Sahrawis inside as well as outside the territory a privileged 
position and a leading role in the bodies and institutions without discrimination.  
As in the case of the Inuits in Greenland, the Sahrawis are the majority in most of the Sahara region (up to 
two thirds of the total population). This number may even increase with the repatriation of refugees and the 
diaspora. This can be considered as an asset and should not give rise to any special challenges in how to 
secure rights for indigenous people. Moreover, the integration of the autonomy status into the Moroccan 
Constitution will guarantee the irreversibility of the devolution of rights and powers to the Sahrawis.  
The main difference is that wars have taken place not long ago in the case of Sahara. This difference gives 
rise to specific challenges in relation to trust and credibility that must be overcome to achieve a positive 
result. In this regard, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Moroccan Initiative call “on the other parties to avail the 
opportunity to write a new chapter in the region’s history” and stresses Morocco’s readiness “to take part in 
serious, constructive negotiations [. . . ] and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.” 
 
The second part deals with basic elements of the Moroccan proposal and specifies the powers to be 
transferred. The powers transferred seem to be close to the United Nations Charter, but less comprehensive 
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than both the 1979 and the 2009 Greenlandic Home Rule Act. Especially external relations seem much more 
restricted compared to Greenland. It can also be mentioned that Greenland got its own flag under the 1979 
Home Rule Act, and that it is a flag without the crux found in the other flags from the North but with red and 
white colours as in the Danish flag. 
The extent of the devolution of powers to the Sahara region can be analyzed taking into account the history 
of the Middle East and North Africa where the culture of power sharing is not deep rooted. The list of such 
powers as contained in paragraph 12 of the Moroccan Initiative includes: 
• The Region’s local administration, local police force and jurisdictions; 
• In the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, 
industry, tourism and agriculture; 
• The Region’s budget and taxation; infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works 
and transportation; 
• In the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social 
security; 
• Cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage; 
• Environment. 
 
Moreover, paragraph 13 of the Initiative lists the financial resources of the Sahara region: 
• Taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region’s competent authorities; 
• Proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources allocated to the Region; 
• The share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the 
Region; 
• The necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity; 
• Proceeds from the Region’s assets. 
In addition, the governance is also linked to the structure and substance of the powers transferred to the 
democratic bodies of the Sahara Region. In this respect, the Moroccan Initiative underlines that: 
• The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the 
various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's 
population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara 
autonomous Region. 
• The Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to 
be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King. 
• The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and 
appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present 
autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament. 
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• Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement 
of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall 
give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King. 
• As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final 
decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of 
the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council. 
 
The third section is about the approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute. The 
Moroccan Initiative provides for negotiations among all parties, free popular consultation, and inclusion of the 
autonomy statute in the Moroccan Constitution. According to paragraph 27, “The Region’s autonomy Statute 
shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free 
referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-
determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the 
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.”  
 
As per paragraph 29, “Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute 
incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country’s 
national juridical architecture.” And paragraph 31 stipulates that “the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, 
declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation 
of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty. This paragraph again stresses that the starting point is 
far from the Greenlandic point of departure for Home Rule. Besides, according to paragraph 25, “The 
Region’s populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of 
human rights as they are universally recognized.” As the seminar organized in Dakhla in 2011 on the 
democracy and human rights dimensions of the Moroccan Initiative concluded, that proposal needs to be 
appreciated in the context of the current political dynamics for enhancing democracy and the rule of law in 
Morocco. 
 
It is also positive that there is recognition of the need for a mutually political solution and that those 
negotiations are the only way ahead. The success of the Moroccan proposal thus depends on the capacity of 
the parties to engage into negotiations in good faith and with a spirit of compromise and realism. A mutually 
acceptable solution of this dispute would turn the Maghreb into a peaceful region and would allow its 
economic integration. 
 
What is lacking is unfolding the negotiators functionality, skills and competencies that can create the needed 
trust and credibility. Factors that were developed during many years in Greenland  
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